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Abstract In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution
concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of coop-
erative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they
are all feasible. In many situations, this assumption is too strong and one
has to deal with some unfeasible coalitions. Defining a game on a subcol-
lection of the power set of the set of players has many implications on the
mathematical structure of the core, depending on the precise structure of
the subcollection of feasible coalitions. Many authors have contributed to
this topic, and we give a unified view of these different results.
MSC Codes: 91A12, 06A06, 90C27
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1 Introduction
Let N := {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. We consider the situation
where these players can form coalitions, and the profit given by the co-
operation of the players in a coalition can be freely distributed among its
members: this is in general referred to as cooperative profit games with
transferable utility, which we will abbreviate in the sequel as TU-games (see,
e.g., Driessen (1988); Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003); Braˆnzei et al. (2005)).
Let v be a TU-game, that is, a set function v : 2N → R such that
v(∅) = 0, assigning to each coalition S ⊆ N its worth (profit) v(S). Let
us assume that forming the grand coalition N is the best way to generate
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profit. One of the main problems in cooperative game theory is to define
a rational sharing among all players of the total worth v(N) of the game.
Any sharing is called a solution of the game, since it solves the (difficult)
problem of sharing the cake.
The literature on solutions of TU-games is very abundant, and many
concepts of solution have been proposed. One may distinguish among them
two main families, namely those solutions which are single-valued, and those
which are set-valued. In the first category, to each game is assigned a sin-
gle solution, which most of the time exists. Best known examples are the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965) and any
other power index used in voting theory (see, e.g., Felsenthal and Machover
(1998)), the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), the τ -value (Tijs, 1981), etc. In
the second category, to each game a set of solutions is assigned. This is
the case of the core (Gillies, 1953; Shapley, 1971), the bargaining set (Au-
mann and Maschler, 1964; Davis and Maschler, 1963), the kernel (Davis and
Maschler, 1965), etc.
Among all these solution concepts, the core remains one of the most ap-
pealing concepts, due to its simple and intuitive definition. Roughly speak-
ing, it is the set of sharing vectors for which “nobody can complain”, or
more exactly, which are coalitionally rational. This means that no coalition
can be better off by splitting from the grand coalition N , i.e., for every
S ⊆ N , the payoff x(S) given to S is at least equal to v(S), the profit that
S can make without cooperating with the other players. The core may be
empty, but when nonempty, it ensures in some sense the stability of the set
of players, hence its interest.
The core is an important notion in economics. In an exchange economy,
the core is defined as the set of situations where no coalition of agents
can improve the utility of its members by reassigning the initial resources
of its own members among them (Debreu and Scarf, 1963). Besides, there
are many examples in economics where a common good or resource has to
be shared among several users (e.g., a river supplying the water of several
towns). The problem of sharing the cost among all the users in a rational
way precisely amounts to find a solution like the core (Ambec and Sprumont,
2002; van den Brink and van der Laan, 2005; van den Brink et al., 2007;
Khmelnitskaya, 2009). The core is also well known in decision theory and
in the field of imprecise probabilities (see the monograph of Walley (1991),
and also Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989)): given a capacity, i.e., a monotonic
game v such that v(N) = 1 (Choquet, 1953) representing the uncertainty
on the set of states of nature, its core is the set of probability measures
compatible with the available information on uncertainty. Conversely, given
a family of probability measures representing some uncertainty on the set
of states of nature, its lower envelope defines a capacity.
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The core has been widely studied, and its properties are well known.
In particular, when nonempty it is a bounded convex polyhedron, and the
famous Bondareva theorem tells us when the core is nonempty (Bondareva,
1963), while Shapley (1971) and later Ichiishi (1981) found the vertices of
the core for convex games.
The classical view in cooperative game theory is to consider that every
coalition can form, i.e., a game v is a mapping defined on 2N , the set of all
subsets of N . A view closer to reality reveals that it is not always possible
to assume that every coalition can form, so that one should distinguish
between feasible and unfeasible coalitions. For example, some hierarchy may
exist on the set of players, and feasible coalitions are those which respect
this hierarchy, in the sense that subordinates should be present (games with
precedence constraints, Faigle and Kern (1992)). Another example is when
coalitions are the connected subgraphs of a communication graph, depicting
who can communicate with whom (Myerson, 1977b). More simply, when
considering political parties, leftist and rightist parties cannot in general
make alliance. In fact, many authors have studied the case where the set of
feasible coalitions is a subcollection of 2N , as this paper will show.
The study of the core under such a general framework becomes much
more difficult. Surprisingly, even if the core, when nonempty, is still a convex
polyhedron, it need not be bounded, and moreover, it need not have vertices.
The structure of the core for convex games, perfectly clear in the classical
case, is complicated by the fact that it is not always possible to speak of
convex games in the usual sense, because the definition of convexity works
for a collection of feasible coalitions closed under union and intersection.
The aim of this survey is precisely to give a unified view of the scattered
results around these questions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic mate-
rial on partially ordered sets and polyhedra. Then Section 3 is devoted to a
comparative study of various families of set systems (collections of feasible
coalitions). Section 4 defines the core and the positive core, and gives the
main classical results that are valid when all coalitions are feasible. Section 5
studies the structure of the core under various assumptions on the set sys-
tem, while Section 6 does the same for the positive core. Finally, Section 7
studies the case of communication graphs.
Throughout the paper, the following notation will be used: we denote
by R+ the set of nonnegative real numbers; N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of
players; for any subset S ⊆ N , 1S denotes the characteristic function (or
vector) of S. For singletons, pairs, etc., we often omit braces and commas
to avoid a heavy notation: we write S \ i, 123 instead of S \{i} and {1, 2, 3}.
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2 Some prerequisites
2.1 Partially ordered sets
The reader can consult, e.g., Davey and Priestley (1990), Birkhoff (1967),
and Gra¨tzer (1998) for more details. A partially ordered set (or poset for
short) (P,≤) (or simply P if no confusion occurs) is a set P endowed with
a partial order ≤ (i.e, a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary rela-
tion). As usual, x < y means x ≤ y and x 6= y, while x ≥ y is equivalent to
y ≤ x. Two elements x, y ∈ P are incomparable, and we denote this by x||y,
if neither x ≤ y nor y ≤ x hold. A useful example of poset in this paper
is (2N ,⊆). We say that x is covered by y, and we write x ≺ y, if x < y
and there is no z ∈ P such that x < z < y. A chain in P is a sequence of
elements x1, . . . , xq such that x1 < · · · < xq, while in an antichain, any two
elements are incomparable. A chain from x1 to xq is maximal if no other
chain can contain it, i.e., it is a sequence of elements x1, . . . , xq such that
x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xq. The length of a chain is its number of elements minus 1.
A subset Q ⊆ P is a downset of P if for any x ∈ Q, y ≤ x implies y ∈ Q
(and similarly for an upset)1. The set of all downsets of P is denoted by
O(P ).
An element x ∈ P is maximal if there is no y ∈ P such that y > x (and
similarly for a minimal element). x ∈ P is the (unique) greatest element (or
top element) of P if x ≥ y for all y ∈ P (and similarly for the least element,
or bottom element). Suppose P has a least element ⊥. Then x is an atom of
P if x ≻ ⊥. Let Q ⊆ P . The element x ∈ P is an upper bound of Q if x ≥ y
for all y ∈ Q (and similarly for a lower bound). For x, y ∈ P , the supremum
of x, y, denoted by x∨ y, is the least upper bound of {x, y}, if it exists (and
similarly for the infimum of x, y, denoted by x ∧ y).
A poset L is a lattice if every pair of elements x, y ∈ L has a supremum
and an infimum. A lattice L is distributive if ∨,∧ obey distributivity, that
is, x∨ (y∧z) = (x∨y)∧ (x∨z) or equivalently x∧ (y∨z) = (x∧y)∨ (x∧z),
for all x, y, z ∈ L. If L is finite, then it has a least and a greatest element,
which we denote by ⊥,⊤ respectively. An element x 6= ⊥ is join-irreducible
if it cannot be expressed as a supremum of other elements, or equivalently, if
it covers only one element. Atoms are join-irreducible elements. We denote
by J (L) the set of all join-irreducible elements. An important result which
will be useful in the sequel is the theorem of Birkhoff (1933): it says that if
the lattice (L,≤) is distributive, then it is isomorphic to O(J (L)), where it
is understood that J (L) is endowed with ≤, and that the set of downsets
is endowed with inclusion. Conversely, any poset P generates a distributive
lattice O(P ). This is illustrated on Figure 2.1
1 Some authors use instead the words ideals and filters. This is however incorrect, since
in the standard terminology, an ideal is a downset closed under supremum, and a filter
is an upset closed under infimum.
The core of games on ordered structures and graphs 5
1 3
4
2
1
2
3
4
∅
1 3
123
3413
134
1234
Fig. 2.1. Left: a distributive lattice L. Join-irreducible elements are those in grey. Middle:
the poset J (L) of join-irreducible elements. Right: the set O(J (L)) of all downsets of
J (L) ordered by inclusion, which is isomorphic to L
Let P be a poset, and x ∈ P . The height of x is the length of a longest
chain in P from a minimal element to x. The height of a lattice L is the
height of its top element, i.e., it is the length of a longest chain from bottom
to top. When the lattice is distributive, its height is |J (L)|.
2.2 Inequalities and polyhedra
We recall only some basic facts useful for the sequel (see, e.g., Ziegler (1995),
Faigle et al. (2002) for details). Our exposition mainly follows Fujishige
(2005, §1.2)
We consider a set of linear equalities and inequalities with real constants
n∑
j=1
aijxj ≤ bi (i ∈ I) (2.1)
n∑
j=1
a′ijxj = b
′
i (i ∈ E). (2.2)
This system defines an intersection of halfspaces and hyperplanes, called
a (closed convex) polyhedron. A set C ⊆ Rn is a convex cone (or simply
a cone) if x, y ∈ C implies that αx + βy ∈ C for all α, β ≥ 0 (conic
combination). The cone is pointed if C ∩ (−C) = {0} (equivalently, if it
has an extreme point, see below). An affine set A is the translation of
a subspace of the vector space Rn. Its dimension is the dimension of the
subspace. A line is a one-dimensional affine set, and a ray is a “half-line”,
i.e., a translation of a set given by {αx | α ≥ 0} for some x ∈ Rn, x 6= 0. An
extreme ray of a cone is a ray whose supporting vector cannot be expressed
as a convex combination of the supporting vectors of other rays. Any cone
can be expressed as the conic combination of its extreme rays. An extreme
point or vertex of a polyhedron P is a point in P which cannot be expressed
as a convex combination of other points in P . A polyhedron is pointed if
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it contains an extreme point. The recession cone C(P ) of a polyhedron P
defined by (2.1) and (2.2) is defined by
n∑
j=1
aijxj ≤ 0 (i ∈ I) (2.3)
n∑
j=1
a′ijxj = 0 (i ∈ E). (2.4)
The recession cone is either a pointed cone (possibly reduced to {0}) or it
contains a line. The following basic properties are fundamental:
(i) P has rays (but no line) if and only if C(P ) is a pointed cone different
from {0};
(ii) P is pointed if and only if C(P ) does not contain a line, or equivalently,
if the system (2.4) and
n∑
j=1
aijxj = 0 (i ∈ I)
has 0 as unique solution.
(iii) P is a polytope (i.e., a bounded polyhedron) if and only if C(P ) = {0}.
The fundamental theorem of polyhedra asserts that any pointed polyhedron
P defined by a system (2.1) and (2.2) is the Minkowski sum of its recession
cone (generated by its extreme rays; this is the conic part of P ) and the
convex hull of its extreme points (the convex part of P ):
P = cone(r1, . . . , rk) + conv(ext(P ))
where r1, . . . , rk are the extreme rays of C(P ), cone() and conv() indicate
respectively the set of all conic and convex combinations, and ext() is the
set of extreme points of some convex set.
If P is not pointed, then it reduces to its recession cone up to a transla-
tion.
3 Set systems
Our study deals with games defined on a collection of feasible coalitions. In
this section, we introduce various possible structures for these collections.
The weakest requirement we introduce is that the collection should include
the grand coalition, and for mathematical convenience, the empty set. There
are however exceptions to this rule.
A set system F on N is a subset of 2N containing ∅ and N . Endowed
with inclusion, F is a poset with top and bottom elements N, ∅ respectively.
The core of games on ordered structures and graphs 7
The set of maximal chains from ∅ to N in F is denoted by C(F). For any
S ⊆ N , we put F(S) := {T ∈ F | T ⊆ S}.
A set system F is atomistic if {i} ∈ F for all i ∈ N .
For any collection F ⊆ 2N , we introduce
F˜ := {S ∈ 2N | S = F1 ∪ · · · ∪ Fk, F1, . . . , Fk ∈ F pairwise disjoint}
the family generated by F (Faigle, 1989).
Let F be a set system. A TU-game (or simply game) on F is a mapping
v : F → R such that v(∅) = 0. The game is monotonic if for S, T ∈ F such
that S ⊆ T , we have v(S) ≤ v(T ) (and therefore v is nonnegative).
When F = 2N , the notion of convexity and superadditivity are well
known. A game is said to be convex if for any S, T ∈ 2N , we have
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
A game v is superadditive if the above inequality holds for disjoint subsets,
i.e., for all S, T ∈ 2N such that S ∩ T = ∅,
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
The above notions generalize as follows. Assume F is a (set) lattice. A game
v on F is convex if for any S, T ∈ F ,
v(S ∨ T ) + v(S ∧ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
Superadditivity amounts to the above inequality restricted to subsets S, T
such that S∧T = ∅. Obviously, one could not speak of convex game if the set
system is not a lattice. It is however possible to find alternative definitions
for weaker structures, as will be seen in the sequel (see Section 6.1, and
supermodular games in Section 6.2).
TheMo¨bius transform of v on F is a real-valued mappingmv on F given
implicitely by the system of equations
v(S) =
∑
F⊆S,F∈F
mv(F ), S ∈ F .
As it is well known, whenF = 2N , we obtainmv(S) =
∑
F⊆S(−1)
|S\F |v(F ).
The Mo¨bius transform is known as the Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi, 1963)
in game theory.
Given these general definitions, we turn to the study of the main families
of set systems.
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3.1 Regular set systems
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n. A set system is k-regular if all maximal chains from ∅ to N
have the same length k (Xie and Grabisch, 2009). A n-regular set system is
simply called a regular set system (Honda and Grabisch, 2008; Lange and
Grabisch, to appear). Equivalently, F is regular if and only if for S, T ∈ F
such that S ≻ T , we have |S \ T | = 1.
Any regular set system satisfies:
(i) One-point extension: if S ∈ F , S 6= N , then ∃i ∈ N \ S such that
S ∪ i ∈ F ;
(ii) Accessibility: if S ∈ F , S 6= ∅, then ∃i ∈ S such that S \ i ∈ F .
The converse is not true (see Figure 3.1).
∅
1
14
134
1234
2
23
123
Fig. 3.1. A set system satisfying one-point extension and accessibility, but which is not
k-regular
In a k-regular set system F , for any S, T ∈ F , all maximal chains from
S to T have the same length.
Remark 3.1. Obviously, regular set systems (and to a less extent, k-regular
set systems) offer a convenient mathematical framework because all maxi-
mal chains have length n, and for this reason many notions (in particular
marginal worth vectors, and therefore the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
and the Weber set (see Section 4)) can be defined as in the classical case
F = 2N . One can however find motivations for such structures which are
more game-theoretically oriented:
(i) The set of connected coalitions in a connected communication graph is a
regular set system (see Section 7). The converse is false: {i} ∈ F for all
i ∈ N is a necessary condition (for necessary and sufficient conditions:
see augmenting systems in Section 3.7).
(ii) Maximal chains correspond to permutations on N (or total orders on
players). A regular set system forbids some permutations, i.e., some or-
derings of the players to enter the game. With k-regular set systems,
k < n, players may enter the game by groups.
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3.2 Convex geometries and antimatroids
A convex geometry F (Edelman and Jamison, 1985) is a collection of subsets
of N containing the empty set, closed under intersection, and satisfying the
one-point extension property. Necessarily N ∈ F , hence it is a set system,
and moreover a regular set system.
An antimatroid F (Dilworth, 1940) is a collection of subsets of N con-
taining the empty set, closed under union, and satisfying the accessibility
property. Any antimatroid satisfies the augmentation property:
S, T ∈ F with |T | > |S| ⇒ ∃i ∈ T \ S s.t. S ∪ i ∈ F .
If F satisfies
⋃
F = N , then N ∈ F . Such antimatroids are called normal
by van den Brink (2009).
Remark 3.2. Algaba et al. (2004) relate antimatroids to permission struc-
tures; see Section 3.4. However, the relation is somewhat artificial since
antimatroids do not always correspond to permission structures (this is the
case of systems closed under ∪,∩). The unusual word “poset antimatroids”
is used, and means the set of upsets (or downsets) of a poset. These are
antimatroids closed under intersection. But it is well known that such set
systems are distributive lattices O(N) (and so could be called poset convex
geometries as well), hence closed under union and intersection (see Sec-
tion 2.1).
3.3 Set lattices
If a set system is a lattice, we call it a set lattice. It need not be closed
under ∩,∪, nor be a k-regular set system (see for example the pentagon on
Figure 3.3 (ii)).
If the lattice is distributive, then we benefit from Birkhoff’s theorem and
we know that it is generated by a poset P . However this poset is not always
N endowed with some partial order. The following can be easily proved and
clarifies the situation (see Xie and Grabisch (2009)):
Proposition 3.3. Let F be a distributive set lattice on N of height k. The
following holds.
(i) F is a k-regular set system, which is generated by a poset P of k ele-
ments, i.e., F is isomorphic to O(P ).
(ii) F is closed under union and intersection if and only if F is isomorphic
to O(P ), where P can be chosen to be a partition of N .
(iii) k = n if and only if F is isomorphic to O(N).
Figure 3.2 shows the relative situation of set lattices and k-regular set sys-
tems. Figure 3.3 shows that all inclusions are strict.
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set lattices
k-regular set systems, 1 ≤ k ≤ n
distributive lattices
closed under ∪,∩
1 ≤ k < n
O(N), k = n
Fig. 3.2. Set lattices and k-regular set systems
∅
1
123
1234
124
2
(i)
∅
1
12
123
23
(ii)
∅
1 2 3
123
(iii)
∅
1 3
123
(iv)
∅
12 3
123
(v)
Fig. 3.3. (i) k-regular but not a lattice; (ii) lattice but not k-regular; (iii) k-regular
lattice but not distributive; (iv) distributive lattice but not closed under ∪; (v) closed
under ∪,∩ but not isomorphic to O(N)
3.4 Systems closed under union and intersection
As seen in Section 3.3, these are particular set lattices, which are distributive
and generated by a partition of N .
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Derks and Gilles (1995) proved that they are equivalent to (conjunctive)
permission structures of Gilles et al. (1992). A (conjunctive) permission
structure is a mapping σ : N → 2N such that i 6∈ σ(i). The players in σ(i)
are the direct subordinates of i. “Conjunctive” means that a player i has to
get the permission to act of all his superiors. Consequently, an autonomous
coalition contains all superiors of every member of the coalition, i.e., the set
of autonomous coalitions generated by the permission structure σ is
Fσ = {S ∈ 2
N | S ∩ σ(N \ S) = ∅}.
Then F is closed under union and intersection if and only if F = Fσ for
some permission structure σ.
See also Algaba et al. (2004) for similar results related to antimatroids
(see Section 3.2). They characterize acyclic permission structures (i.e., where,
for all i ∈ N , in the set of all subordinates (not limited to the direct ones)
of i, i is not present) by distributive lattices O(N) (called there poset anti-
matroids).
3.5 Weakly union-closed systems
A set system F is weakly union-closed if F ∪ F ′ ∈ F for all F, F ′ ∈ F such
that F ∩ F ′ 6= ∅.
An important consequence is that for any S ⊆ N , F(S) := {F ∈ F |
F ⊆ S} has pairwise disjoint maximal elements.
The basis of F is the collection of sets S in F which cannot be written
as S = A ∪ B, with A,B ∈ F , A,B 6= S, A ∩ B 6= ∅ (Bilbao, 2000, Chap.
6). All singletons and pairs of F are in the basis. Clearly, knowing the basis
permits to recover F .
Remark 3.4. (i) This terminology is used by Faigle and Grabisch (2009).
Weakly union-closed systems have been studied under the name union
stable systems by Algaba (1998) (summarized in Bilbao (2000, Chap.
6)).
(ii) They are closely related to communication graphs because if F rep-
resents a communication graph (i.e., F is the collection of connected
coalitions of the graph; see Section 7), then the union of two inter-
secting connected coalitions must be connected. van den Brink (2009)
characterized those weakly union-closed collections which correspond to
communication graphs: F ⊆ 2N is the set of connected coalitions of some
comunication graph if and only if ∅ ∈ F , F is normal (i.e.,
⋃
F = N),
weakly union-closed, and satisfies 2-accessibility (i.e., S ∈ F with |S| > 1
implies that there exist distinct i, j ∈ S such that S \ i and S \ j belong
to F). Another characterization is due to Bilbao through augmenting
systems (see Section 3.7).
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(iii) Similarly, they are also related to the more general notion of conference
structures of Myerson (1980), which generalize communication graphs.
A conference structure Q is a collection of subsets of N of cardinality at
least 2. Two players i, j are connected if there is a sequence S1, . . . , Sk of
sets in Q such that i ∈ S1, j ∈ Sk, and Sℓ∩Sℓ+1 6= ∅ for ℓ = 1, . . . , k−1.
Then, F := {S ⊆ N | ∀i, j ∈ S, i and j are connected} is a weakly
union-closed system. Conversely, given a weakly union-closed system F ,
the basis of F restricted to sets of cardinality at least 2 can be considered
as a conference structure. An equivalent view of this is given by van den
Nouweland et al. through hypergraphs (van den Nouweland et al., 1992),
since in a hypergraph, a (hyper)link joins several nodes (and thus can be
viewed as a subset of cardinality at least 2). Thus, a path in a hypergraph
corresponds to a sequence S1, . . . , Sk as described above.
3.6 Partition systems
They were studied by Bilbao (2000, §5.1) and Algaba et al. (2001). A par-
tition system is a collection F ⊆ 2N containing the empty set, all single-
tons, and such that for every S ⊆ N , the maximal subsets of S in F form
a partition of S (equivalently, F contains ∅, all singletons and is weakly
union-closed).
Any set system induced by a communication graph is a partition system.
If F is a partition system, then F˜ = 2N .
3.7 Augmenting systems
An augmenting system (Bilbao, 2003; Bilbao and Ordo´n˜ez, 2009, 2008) is a
collection F ⊆ 2N containing ∅, being weakly union-closed, and satisfying
∀S, T ∈ F s.t. S ⊆ T, ∃i ∈ T \ S s.t. S ∪ i ∈ F .
Remark 3.5. (i) In Bilbao (2003), it is required in addition that
⋃
F = N
(obviously, this property should always be required when dealing with
collections of subsets).
(ii) N does not necessarily belong to F . IfN ∈ F , the above property implies
that all maximal chains from ∅ to N have the same length n, and thus
F is a regular set system. The converse is false.
If N 6∈ F , by weak union-closure, all maximal sets in F , say F1, . . . , Fk,
are disjoint, and no F ∈ F can intersect two distinct maximal subsets.
Therefore, F can be partitioned into augmenting subsystems F1, . . . ,Fk
on F1, . . . , Fk respectively, which are all regular. Hence, it is sufficient
to study the case where N ∈ F .
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(iii) An augmenting system is an antimatroid (respectively, convex geometry)
if and only if F is closed under union (respectively, intersection).
(iv) Augmenting systems are of particular importance since they permit to
characterize communication graphs (see Section 7). Specifically, if G is a
communication graph, the set of connected coalitions is an augmenting
system. Conversely, an augmenting system is the collection of connected
coalitions of a communication graph if {i} ∈ F for all i ∈ N . Each
connected component of the graph corresponds to the augmenting sub-
systems F1, . . . ,Fk mentionned in (ii).
Augmenting systems are also closely related to the previously introduced
structures, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.6. F is an augmenting system containing N if and only if
it is regular and weakly union-closed.
Proof. The “only if” part has been already noticed above. Now, suppose it
is regular. Take S ⊆ T in F , then they lie on some chain. Since the system
is regular, there are t − s − 1 subsets between S and T , which implies the
augmentation property.
The various relations between regular set systems, weakly union-closed sys-
tems and augmenting systems are illustrated on Figure 3.4. Figure 3.5 shows
regular set systems
weakly union-closed systems
augmenting systems with N
regular set lattices
antimatroids with N
convex geometriesO(N)
Fig. 3.4. Regular set systems and weakly union-closed systems
that it is possible to have regular set lattices which are not weakly union-
closed, and weakly union-closed regular systems not being a lattice.
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∅
1
13
134
1234
234
23
2
∅
1 2
13 14 23 24
123 134 124234
1234
Fig. 3.5. Left: regular set lattice but not weakly union-closed. Right: regular and weakly
union-closed but not a lattice, since 1 and 2 have no supremum
3.8 Coalition structures
Our last category is of different nature since it is not a set system in our
sense, and its motivation is very different from the notion of feasible coali-
tion. Its origin comes from the domain of coalition formation. We neverthe-
less mention it here due to its importance, although the topic of coalition
formation falls outside the scope of this survey (see, e.g., Holler and Owen
(2001), van Deemen (1997)).
A coalition structure on N is a partition of N (Aumann and Dre`ze,
1974). It is called by Owen (1977) a priori union structures.
Let v be a game on 2N , and consider a coalition structure B := {B1, . . . , Bm}.
Given a payoff vector x, Bk ∈ B, we define the game v∗x on 2
Bk by
v∗x(S) =
{
maxT⊆N\Bk(v(S ∪ T )− x(T )), S ⊂ Bk, S 6= ∅
v(S), S = Bk or ∅.
Remark 3.7. The above definition considers a game in the classical sense,
and not on the blocks of the partition. Another type of game suited for
coalition structures is global games and games in partition function form.
We mention them without further development since their nature is too
far away from coalitional games. A global game (Gilboa and Lehrer, 1991)
is a real-valued mapping defined on the set Π(N) of partitions of N : it
assigns some worth to any coalition structure. A game in partition function
form (Thrall and Lucas, 1963) is a mapping v assigning a real number to
a coalition S and a partition π containing S: knowing that the coalition
structure is some π ∈ Π(N) such that S ∈ π, v(S, π) is the worth of S in
this organization of the society.
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4 The core and related notions
Let v be a game on a set system F . A payoff vector is any x ∈ Rn. It
represents some amount of money given to the players. By commodity we
write x(S) :=
∑
i∈S xi for any S ⊆ N . A payoff vector is efficient if x(N) =
v(N). The pre-imputation set of v is the set of all efficient payoff vectors.
We define the imputation set of v as
I(v) := {x ∈ Rn | xi ≥ v({i}) if {i} ∈ F and x(N) = v(N)}.
The core of v is defined by
core(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ F and x(N) = v(N)}.
The positive core of v is defined by (Faigle, 1989):
core+(v) := {x ∈ Rn+ | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ F and x(N) = v(N)}.
Remark 4.1. (i) The classical definition of the core (Shapley, 1971) is recov-
ered with F = 2N . It should be noted that the definition is meaningful
only if the game is a profit game. For cost games, the inequalities should
be reversed. The core is the set of payoff vectors which are coalitionally
rational: no coalition can have a better profit if it splits from the grand
coalition N .
(ii) If F contains all singletons and the game is monotonic, the distinction
between the core and the positive core is void since they coincide. The
positive core retains imputations which are nonnegative, which means
that in no case the players would have to pay something instead of being
rewarded. This notion is natural essentially if the game is monotonic,
for otherwise there would exist players with negative contribution to the
game, and those players should be penalized; see also Remark 6.1.
(iii) The (positive) core is also well known in decision under risk and uncer-
tainty: it is the set of probability measures dominating a given capac-
ity (monotonic game); see, e.g., Walley (1991). More surprisingly, the
(positive) core with the reversed inequalities is a well-known concept
in combinatorial optimization, under the name of base polyhedron of a
polymatroid (Edmonds, 1970), where a polymatroid is nothing else than
a submodular2 monotonic game. As we will see, many theorems shown
in game theory about the core were already known in combinatorial
optimization; see the excellent monograph of Fujishige (2005).
We recall the classical results on the core when F = 2N .
2 When F is closed under ∪,∩, a submodular game, also called concave, satisfies the
inequality v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N .
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A first important question is to know whether the core is empty or not.
A collection B of nonempty subsets of 2N is balanced if there exist positive
coefficients λB , B ∈ B, such that∑
B∈B
λB1B = 1N .
The vector λ := (λB)B∈B is called the balancing vector. Balanced collections
generalize the notion of partitions. Derks and Peters (1998) have shown that
a collection is balanced if and only if for all y ∈ Rn such that y(N) = 0
(side-payment vector), if y(S) > 0 for some S ∈ B, then it exists S′ ∈ B
such that y(S′) < 0.
A game v on 2N is balanced if for every balanced collection B with
balancing vector λ it holds∑
B∈B
λBv(B) ≤ v(N).
This could be interpreted by saying that there is no advantage in divid-
ing the grand coalition into balanced collections. The following well-known
result is an easy consequence of the duality theorem of linear programming.
Theorem 4.2. (Bondareva, 1963) Let v be a game on 2N . Then core(v) 6= ∅
if and only if v is balanced.
Obviously, the interest of the theorem is more mathematical than algo-
rithmical. It cannot reasonably be used for testing the nonemptiness of the
core of a given game. Since the core is a set of linear inequalities, classical
tools testing the feasability of a set of inequalities, like the Fourier-Motzkin
elimination, or simply a linear programming solver, should be used.
Assuming that the core is nonempty, it is a polytope, and therefore the
question of knowing its vertices arises. To each maximal chain C ∈ C(2N )
with C = {∅, S1, . . . , Sn = N}, corresponds bijectively a permutation σ ∈
S(N), the set of permutations on N , such that
Si = {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}, i = 1, . . . , n.
Considering a game v on 2N , to each permutation σ (or maximal chain C)
we assign a marginal worth vector φσ (or φC) in Rn by:
φσσ(i) := v(Si)− v(Si−1) = v(Si−1 ∪ σ(i))− v(Si−1).
The Weber set is the convex hull of all marginal worth vectors:
W(v) := conv(φC | C ∈ C(2N )).
The following inclusion always holds
core(v) ⊆ W(v).
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Theorem 4.3. The following assertions are equivalent.
(i) v is convex
(ii) All marginal vectors φC , C ∈ C(2N) (or φσ, σ ∈ S(N)), belong to the
core
(iii) core(v) = conv({φσ}σ∈S(N))
(iv) ext(core(v)) = {φσ}σ∈S(N).
Shapley (1971) proved (i)⇒(ii) and (i)⇒(iv), while Ichiishi (1981) proved
(ii)⇒(i). Edmonds (1970) proved the same result as Shapley. This is also
mentionned in (Lova´sz, 1983). This result clearly shows why convexity is
an important property for games. Indeed, in this case, the core is nonempty
and its structure is completely known. In the subsequent sections, we will
see that much effort is done for games defined on set systems in order to
preserve these properties as far as possible.
5 Structure of the core
5.1 General results for arbitrary set systems
We begin by some simple considerations on the imputation set. If F is
atomistic, then I(v) 6= ∅ if and only if v(N) ≥
∑
i∈N v({i}). If F is not
atomistic, then it is always true that I(v) 6= ∅. Indeed, if {j} 6∈ F , just
take xi = v(i) if {i} ∈ F , xj = v(N) −
∑
{i}∈F v(i), and xi = 0 otherwise.
Similarly, I(v) is bounded if and only if F is atomistic.
The first question we address is to know when the core is nonempty.
It is easy to see that the classical definitions and result of Bondareva on
balancedness still work: core(v) 6= ∅ if and only if v is balanced, where
balanced collections are understood as collections in F . Another result is due
to Faigle (1989), with a different (but equivalent) definition of balancedness.
A game v on F is balanced if for all families A1, . . . , Ak in F and m ∈ N it
holds
1
m
k∑
i=1
1Ai = 1N implies
1
m
k∑
i=1
v(Ai) ≤ v(N).
In the above, it should be noted that repetitions are allowed in the family
and that the length of a family is arbitrary.
Assuming that core(v) is nonempty, one can define its lower envelope
v∗, which is a game on 2
N :
v∗(S) := min
x∈core(v)
x(S), ∀S ⊆ N.
Note that v∗(N) = v(N), and if F = 2N , we have core(v∗) = core(v).
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Remark 5.1. The lower envelope is an important notion in decision theory
(see Walley (1991)). In game theory, it is called the Harsanyi mingame
(Derks et al., 2008).
An important question is to know whether the equality v = v∗ holds. Such
games are called exact. If a game v is exact, by the above mentioned prop-
erty, it is the smallest game having the core equal to core(v). Faigle (1989)
proved the next result:
Theorem 5.2. A game v is exact if and only if for all families A,A1, . . . , Ak
in F \ {∅} and m, l ∈ N,
k∑
i=1
1Ai = m1N + l1A implies
k∑
i=1
v(Ai) ≤ mv(N) + lv(A).
As above, repetitions are allowed in the family. This is similar to a result
of Schmeidler (1972), proved when F is a (possibly infinite) family closed
under union and complementation: v is exact if and only if for all S ∈ F
v(S) = sup
{∑
i
aiv(Si)− a|v| s.t.
∑
i
ai1Si − a1N ≤ 1S ,
with a ∈ R+, (ai, Si) is a finite sequence in R+ ×F
}
,
and |v| := sup{
∑
i aiv(Si) | (ai, Si) is a finite sequence in R+×F s.t.
∑
i ai1Si ≤
1N}.
When nonempty, the core is a polyhedron. Therefore it makes sense to
speak of its recession cone (proposed under the name of core of the set
system F by Derks and Reijnierse (1998), hence the notation):
core(F) := {x ∈ Rn | x(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ F and x(N) = 0}.
A direct application of results of Section 2.2 leads to:
(i) core(v) has rays if and only if core(F) is a pointed cone different from
{0}. Then core(F) corresponds to the conic part of core(v);
(ii) core(v) has no vertices if and only if core(F) contains a line;
(iii) core(v) is a polytope if and only if core(F) = {0}.
Therefore, it remains to study the structure of the recession cone. We in-
troduce
span(F) :=
{
S ⊆ N | 1S =
∑
T∈F
λT1T for some λT ∈ R
}
.
F is non-degenerate if span(F) = 2N 3. Non-degeneracy implies the dis-
cerning property (see Section 5.2). The converse holds if F is closed under
3 In fact, it is simpler to check the following equivalent condition: for all i ∈ N , it exists
a linear combination of the 1T ’s, T ∈ F , giving 1i.
The core of games on ordered structures and graphs 19
∪,∩ (see Theorem 5.10). We give two easy sufficient conditions for F to be
non-degenerate:
(i) F contains all singletons (obvious from Footnote 3);
(ii) F is regular. Indeed, since any chain has length n, all 1i’s can be recov-
ered from 1Sj − 1Sj−1 , for two consecutive sets Sj, Sj−1 in a chain.
Theorem 5.3. (Derks and Reijnierse, 1998) core(F) is a pointed cone if
and only if F is non-degenerate.
This result is easy to see from Footnote 2 and Section 2.2. Indeed, non-
degeneracy is equivalent to the existence of linear combinations of the 1T ’s,
T ∈ F , giving all 1i’s, i ∈ N , and the same linear combinations can be used
to express all xi’s, i ∈ N , from the system x(T ) = 0, T ∈ F , thus proving
that this system has a unique solution (which is 0). But this is equivalent
to say that the recession cone is a pointed cone.
We recall that F is balanced if ∃λS > 0 for all S ∈ F such that 1N =∑
S∈F λS1S .
Theorem 5.4. (Derks and Reijnierse, 1998) core(F) is a linear subspace
if and only if F is balanced.
Therefore, core(F) = {0} if and only if F is balanced and non-degenerate.
Lastly, considering a game v on F , we introduce the following extension
of v to F˜ (Faigle, 1989)
v˜(S) := max
{∑
i∈I
v(Fi), {Fi}i∈I is a F -partition of S
}
,
where by a F -partition we mean a partition whose blocks belong to F . The
game v˜ is superadditive, and if v˜(N) = v(N), then core(v) = core(v˜), which
is easy to show.
Remark 5.5. If F contains all singletons (e.g., a partition system), then F˜ =
2N , and so v˜ is an extension of v on 2N : compare with the extension v defined
in Section 6.3. Also, v˜ is a partitioning game of Kaneko and Wooders (see
Section 5.4). If v is a superadditive game on a partition system, then v˜ = v.
In Bilbao (2000, §5.3) it is shown that if F is a partition system containing
N and v(N) = v(N) = v˜(N), then core(v) = core(v˜).
5.2 Set systems closed under ∪, ∩
Let F be a set system closed under ∪,∩ (such systems are distributive
lattices, and correspond to permission structures; see Section 3.4). For each
i ∈ N we define
Di :=
⋂
{S ∈ F | S ∋ i} = smallest S in F containing i.
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Proposition 5.6. The set of Di’s coincides with the set of join-irreducible
elements of F , i.e.,
{Di}i∈N = J (F).
Moreover, if the height of F is strictly smaller than n, necessarily we have
Di = Dj for some i, j (the height equals the number of distinct Di’s).
Proof. Suppose there is some Di which is not a join-irreducible element.
Then Di can be written as the supremum of other elements, which are
smaller. Since F is closed under ∪, one of these elements must contain i, a
contradiction with the definition of Di.
Conversely, take a join-irreducible element S. If S = {i}, we are done.
Assume then that |S| > 1. Since it covers only one subset, say S′, for any i
in S \ S′, S is the smallest subset containing i, whence the result.
Finally, since F is a distributive lattice, its height is the number of join-
irreducible elements, hence someDi’s must coincide if the height is less than
n.
Remark 5.7. The sets Di’s are introduced in Derks and Gilles (1995). They
are also known in the literature of combinatorial optimization (see Fujishige
(2005, Sec. 3.3) and Fujishige (2005, Sec. 7.2 (b.1)) (principal partitions)).
Theorem 5.8.
core(F) = cone(1j − 1i | i ∈ N and j ∈ Di).
If F is not closed under ∪,∩, then any 1j − 1i is a ray of core(F).
Remark 5.9. This result is due to Derks and Gilles (1995). It was in fact
proved when the system is of the type O(N) in a more precise form by
Tomizawa (Tomizawa (1983), cited in Fujishige (2005, Th. 3.26)): it says
that the extreme rays are those corresponding to j ≻ i in (N,≤). Note that
it could be easily adapted if the lattice is not generated by N , but by a
partition of N (see Proposition 3.3).
The set system F is discerning if all Di’s are different (equivalently, by
Proposition 5.6, if the height of F is n, which is a much simpler condition).
Theorem 5.10. (Derks and Gilles, 1995) Consider F to be closed under
∪,∩. core(F) is a pointed cone if and only if F is discerning.
This result is easy to deduce from previous facts. If the recession cone is
pointed, then F is non-degenerate by Theorem 5.3, which implies the dis-
cerning property as mentionned above. If F is discerning, then its height is
n, and so it is regular, which implies that it is non-degenerate, and therefore,
the recession cone is pointed.
When F is of the type O(N), for any maximal chain C ∈ C(F), define
the marginal vector associated to C like in the classical case, and define the
Weber set as the convex hull of all marginal vectors.
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Theorem 5.11. Let F be of the type O(N). Then the convex part of the
core is included in the Weber set.
Theorem 5.12. Let F be of the type O(N). Then v is convex if and only
if the convex part of the core is equal to the Weber set.
Remark 5.13. The two last theorems are shown by Grabisch and Xie (2009),
but they can deduced from Derks and Gilles (1995), where they are stated
for acyclic permission structures. Indeed, from Algaba et al. (2004), we know
that these systems are equivalent to distributive lattices of the type O(N)
(see Section 3.4). The “only if” part of the latter theorem was already shown
by Fujishige and Tomizawa (1983).
Lastly, we address a slightly more general case, where closure under
union is replaced by weak union-closure. The following development is due
to Faigle (1989).A,B ⊆ N is a crossing pair ifA,B intersect,A∪B 6= N and
A \B,B \A are nonempty. Then F is a crossing family if A∪B,A∩B ∈ F
whenever A,B is a crossing pair. v on a crossing family F is convex if for
every crossing pair v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
Theorem 5.14. Suppose F is weakly union-closed and closed under inter-
section. Then F˜ is closed under union and intersection, and v convex on F
implies v˜ convex on F˜ .
Theorem 5.15. Suppose F is weakly union-closed and closed under inter-
section, and v on F is convex. Then v is balanced if and only if for all
partitions (with nonempty blocks, as usual) {A1, . . . , Ak} of N ,
v(A1) + . . . v(Ak) ≤ v(N).
Now, if the Ai’s are only pairwise disjoint, this characterizes complete bal-
ancedness (see Section 6).
5.3 Convex Geometries
The core of games on convex geometries has been studied by Bilbao et al.
(1999).
Theorem 5.16. Let v be a game on a convex geometry F .
(i) core(v) is either empty or a pointed polyhedron (i.e., having vertices).
(ii) Assume that core(v) 6= ∅ and that v is nonnegative. Then core(v) is a
polytope if and only if F is atomistic if and only if core(v) = core+(v).
Remark 5.17. (i) is clear from Theorem 5.3 since a convex geometry is non-
degenerate (since n-regular). (ii) was already remarked by Faigle (1989) (see
Theorem 6.2).
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A game v is quasi-convex if convexity holds only for pairs A,B ∈ F such
that A ∪ B ∈ F . Marginal vectors are defined as usual, considering all
maximal chains in F (all of length n).
Theorem 5.18. A game v on F is quasi-convex if and only if all marginal
vectors belong to the core.
5.4 Partition systems
Let F be a partition system, v be a game on F , and v its extension on 2N
(see Section 6.3). If N ∈ F , it is easy to establish that core(v) ⊆ core(v).
Kaneko and Wooders (1982) deal with a weaker definition of partition
systems. A partition system only needs to contain all singletons. Then a
partitioning game v is a game on 2N defined from some game v′ on F by
v(S) = max
{∑
i∈I
v′(Fi), {Fi}i∈I is a F -partition of S
}
.
Then v is superadditive and core(v) = core(v′) when N ∈ F .
5.5 k-regular set systems
The core of games on k-regular set systems has been studied by Xie and
Grabisch (2009). We mentioned in Section 5.1 that a n-regular set system
is non-degenerate, hence Theorem 5.3 applies and the core is a pointed
polyhedron, unbounded in general. However, in many cases, F could be
degenerate, and in this case the core has no vertices. This is the case for the
2-regular set system given in Figure 5.1.
∅
1
123
23
Fig. 5.1. Example of a degenerate 2-regular set system with 3 players
Let F be a k-regular set system, and a maximal chain C := {∅ =
S0, S1, . . . , Sk = N}. Since |Si \Si−1| > 1 may occur, the classical definition
of a marginal worth vector does not work. Instead, from a given maximal
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chain, several marginal worth vectors can be derived. Choose an element ri
in Si \ Si−1, i = 1, . . . , k. The marginal worth vector associated to C and
r1, . . . , rk is defined by
ψC(r1,...,rk) =
k∑
i=1
(v(Si)− v(Si−1))1ri .
We have ψC(r1,...,rk)(Si) = v(Si) for all Si ∈ C. Denote by M(v,F) the set
of all marginal worth vectors, for all maximal chains and possible choices of
elements. We define the Weber set as
W(v) := conv(M(v,F)).
Theorem 5.19. Let F be a k-regular lattice closed under union and inter-
section. If v is convex, then W(v) ⊆ core(v).
Theorem 5.20. Let F be a n-regular lattice. If v is monotone and convex,
then W(v) ⊆ core(v).
The classical inclusion of the convex part of the core into the Weber set
does not hold in general, as shown by the following counterexample4.
Consider the following sets system (regular set lattice but not distribu-
tive, since it contains a pentagon, figured by the grey circles), with the
values of the game v given into parentheses.
∅
(-1) 1
(-1) 12
123 (0)
23 (0)
2 (-1)
13 (0)
The core is defined by
x1 ≥ −1
x2 ≥ −1
x1 + x2 ≥ −1
x1 + x3 ≥ 0
x2 + x3 ≥ 0
x1 + x2 + x3 = 0
4 This example was communicated by J. Derks.
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The core is bounded and vertices are (0, 0, 0), (−1, 0,+1), (0,−1,+1). The
Weber set is generated by the marginal vectors associated to the 4 maximal
chains (only 2 differents):
(0,−1,+1), (−1, 0,+1).
Clearly, W(v) 6∋ (0, 0, 0).
Remark 5.21. As noted in Section 6.1, the same phenomenon occurs for
the positive core of games on augmenting systems. However, one should be
careful that this kind of (negative) result heavily depends on the definition
given to the marginal vectors: the framework given in Section 6.2, which is
more general than augmenting systems, does not exhibit this drawback.
5.6 Distributive lattices generated by a poset on N
Consider F = O(N) for some partial order ≤ on N . Then F is a regular
distributive set lattice, and previous results give us the properties of the
core. Considering a balanced game v, we have:
(i) core(v) is a pointed polyhedron, since F is non-degenerate (see Sec-
tion 5.1);
(ii) coreF (v) ⊆ W(v), where coreF (v) is the convex part of core(v) (see
Theorem 5.11);
(iii) v is convex if and only if coreF (v) =W(v) (see Theorem 5.12).
To avoid unboundedness, Grabisch and Xie (2009) have imposed further
restrictions in the definition of the core, leading to the notion of restricted
core. These additional constraints are built as follows. First, elements in
(N,≤) of same height i are put into the level set Qi+1. Hence, N is parti-
tioned into level sets Q1, . . . , Qk , and Q1 contains all minimal elements of
N . The level sets Q1, . . . , Qk induce in F a partition whose blocks are level
sets S1, . . . , Sk:
S1 := O(Q1), S2 := O(Q1∪Q2)\S1, . . . , Sq := O(N)\ (S1∪· · ·∪Sq−1).
Each Si has a top element ⊤i =
⋃i
j=1 Qi. Restricted maximal chains from
⊥ to ⊤ in O(N) are those passing through all ⊤1, . . . ,⊤k = ⊤. They induce
restricted marginal vectors. These definitions are illustrated on Figure 5.2.
The restricted core of a game v is defined as follows:
core∗(v) = {x ∈ core(v) | x(⊤i) = v(⊤i), i = 1, . . . , k}.
If nonempty, it is always a polytope. The restricted Weber set W∗(v) is
defined as the convex hull of all restricted marginal vectors.
Theorem 5.22. For any game v on F , core∗(v) ⊆ W∗(v). Furthermore, if
v is convex, equality holds, and the restricted marginal vectors are vertices
of the core.
The converse (core∗(v) =W∗(v) implies convexity of v) is false.
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1
2
3
4
∅
1 3
123
34
13 = ⊤1
134
1234 = ⊤2
Fig. 5.2. The poset (N,≤) (left) and the generated lattice O(N) (right). Level sets
on (N,≤) are Q1 = {1, 3} and Q2 = {2, 4}, inducing level sets S1 = {1, 3, 13} and
S2 = {34, 123, 134, 1234} in O(N). A restricted maximal chain is drawn in grey.
5.7 Coalition structures
Let B be a coalition structure and v on 2N being zero-normalized (i.e.,
v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N). The core is defined as follows (Aumann and
Dre`ze, 1974):
core(v,B) := {x ∈ Rn | x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ 2N , and x(Bk) = v(Bk), k = 1, . . . ,m}.
Theorem 5.23. Let B be a coalition structure and v on 2N being zero-
normalized, and let x ∈ core(v,B). Then
{y ∈ RBk | (y, x|N\Bk) ∈ core(v,B)} = core(Bk, v
∗
x, Xk),
with core(Bk, v
∗
x, Xk) := {y ∈ R
Bk
+ | y(Bk) = v
∗
x(Bk), y(S) ≥ v
∗
x(S), ∀S ⊆
Bk, }.
6 Structure of the positive core
We first address the question of nonemptiness. Adapting the result of Bon-
dareva, we say that a collection B is completely balanced if there exist posi-
tive coefficients λB, B ∈ B such that∑
B∈B
λB1B ≤ 1N .
Then a game is completely balanced if
∑
B∈B λBv(B) ≤ v(N) holds for
every completely balanced collection, and core+(v) 6= ∅ if and only if v is
completely balanced.
An equivalent definition of a completely balanced game is given by Faigle
(1989). A game v is completely balanced if and only if for all families
A1, . . . , Ak in F and m ∈ N it holds
1
m
k∑
i=1
1Ai ≤ 1N implies
1
m
k∑
i=1
v(Ai) ≤ v(N).
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Above, F ∋ ∅ is assumed, in order to get the condition v(N) ≥ 0 by con-
sidering the family reduced to ∅. If F is closed under intersection and com-
plementation, a nonnegative balanced game is completely balanced.
Remark 6.1. The positive core is in general much smaller than the core,
and could be empty even if the core is nonempty. In particular, if v is not
monotone, the positive core is likely to be empty. See also the discussion
below on the equality between the core and the positive core.
An important question is to know when the core and the positive core
coincide.
Theorem 6.2. (Faigle, 1989) Let v be a nonnegative balanced game on F
closed under intersection. Then core(v) = core+(v) if and only if F is atom-
istic. Moreover, core(v) is unbounded unless core(v) = core+(v).
F atomistic implies core(v) = core+(v) is obvious by nonnegativity of v.
Also, if core(v) 6= core+(v) then F is not atomistic, and for {j} 6∈ F , xj can
be taken arbitrarily negatively large, hence unboundedness.
6.1 The positive core for augmenting systems
This has been studied by Bilbao and Ordo´n˜ez (2008). Given a (nonnegative)
game v on F , we consider its extension vˆ on 2N :
v(S) :=
∑
T maximal in F(S)
v(T ).
(see Section 6.3). Recall that maximal sets in F(S) are pairwise disjoint.
Since N does not necessarily belong to F , the definition of the core is
slightly modified as follows:
core+(v) := {x ∈ Rn+ | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ F and x(N) = v(N)}.
A fundamental (but obvious) property is that core+(v) = core+(v) (see
Section 7 for a close result, as well as Remark 6.7(v) for a more general
result), and it is a polytope.
Suppose that N ∈ F (hence it is a regular set system). Then any max-
imal chain in F corresponds to an ordering on N (compatible orderings or
permutations). For a maximal chain C, denote by φC the corresponding
marginal worth vector. Then the Weber set is naturally defined by
W(v) := conv{φC | C ∈ C(F)}.
Define v to be convex if for all S, T ∈ F such that S ∪ T ∈ F ,
v(S ∪ T ) +
∑
F maximal in F(S∩T )
v(F ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )
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(this is identical to supermodular games on weakly union-closed systems in
Section 6.2).
Theorem 6.3. (Bilbao and Ordo´n˜ez, 2008) If v is monotone and convex,
then W(v) ⊆ core+(v), and any marginal vector is a vertex of core+(v).
The classical inclusion of the core in the Weber set does not hold in gen-
eral: a counterexample is given in Bilbao and Ordo´n˜ez (2008) (see also
Remark 5.21).
A game v is superadditive if for all disjoint S, T ∈ F such that S∪T ∈ F ,
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
Theorem 6.4. (Bilbao and Ordo´n˜ez, 2008) Let v be a game on F .
(i) If v is superadditive and monotone, then v is superadditive and mono-
tone.
(ii) If v is convex and monotone, then v is convex.
(iii) Suppose v is monotone. Then v is convex if and only if v is convex if
and only if core(v) =W(v).
6.2 The positive core and Monge extensions
It is possible to get more general results, valid for an arbitrary set system
or a weakly-union closed system, by considering an approach closer to com-
binatorial optimization, through the so-called Monge algorithm5. We refer
the reader to Faigle et al. (2009) for details and proofs.
Consider an arbitrary set system F , and a vector c ∈ Rn, which will be
the input vector of the Monge algorithm (MA). The idea of the algorithm is
to take at each iteration the largest subset F of F contained in the current
set X , and to select in F the first element p corresponding to the smallest
component of a vector γ ∈ Rn. At initialization, X = N and γ = c, and at
each iteration, p is discarded from X , and γp is subtracted from γi, for all
i ∈ F .
5 The original idea of the Monge algorithm goes back to Monge (1781). Monge studied
a geometric transportation problem in which a set of locations s1, . . . , sn of mass points
has to be matched optimally (in the sense of minimizing the total cost) with another set
of locations t1, . . . , tn, and proved that optimality was reached if the transportation lines
do not cross. This geometric fact can be expressed as follows: if the costs cij of matching
objects si with tj have the “uncrossing” property:
cij + ckℓ ≥ cmax(i,k),max(j,ℓ) + cmin(i,k),min(j,ℓ)
then the optimal matching is (s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn). This is also called the “north-west
corner rule”. Translated into the language of set functions, the uncrossing property is in
fact submodularity:
v(A) + v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ B) + v(A ∩ B).
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The output of the algorithm is the sequence of all selected subsets F ,
the sequence of all selected elements p, and a vector y ∈ RF recording at
index F the quantity γp.
We define Γ (y) := 〈v, y〉. Letting for any input c ∈ Rn
vˆ(c) := Γ (y),
vˆ is an extension of v since it can be proven that vˆ(1F ) = v(F ) for any
F ∈ F . Moreover,
core+(v) = {x ∈ Rn | 〈c, x〉 ≥ vˆ(c), ∀c ∈ Rn}.
The next step is to define marginal vectors, usually defined through
permutations on N . The idea here is to take instead the sequence of selected
elements p produced by MA, which is not necessarily a permutation, because
some elements ofN may be absent. Let us denote byΠ the set of all possible
sequences produced by MA, and consider a sequence π ∈ Π . Then the
marginal vector xπ associated to π is computed as follows: for each p ∈ π,
xπp is the difference between v(F ) (where F is the smallest selected subset
containing p) and
∑
G v(G), where the sum is running over all maximal
subsets of F belonging to the sequence. For each p 6∈ π, we put xπp = 0.
Clearly, the classical definition is recovered if F is regular, since in this
case, the sequence of selected subsets will form a maximal chain.
We define the Weber set as
W(v) := conv{xπ | π ∈ Π}.
Then it is proved in Faigle et al. (2009) that core+(v) ⊆ W(v).
The last step is to relate equality of the Weber set and the core to
convexity. This is done through the following definition. A game v on F is
convex if vˆ is concave, i.e., it satisfies for all parameter vectors c, d ∈ RN
and real scalars 0 < t < 1,
tvˆ(c) + (1− t)vˆ(d) ≤ vˆ(tc+ (1− t)d).
Theorem 6.5. Assume v is monotone. Then v is convex if and only if
core+(v) =W(v).
The above definition of convexity is done through the extension vˆ. How-
ever, it is possible to relate it directly to v. A game v on F is strongly mono-
tone if for any F ∈ F and pairwise disjoint feasible sets G1, . . . , Gf ∈ F(F )
we have
f∑
ℓ=1
v(Gℓ) ≤ v(F ).
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For any intersecting F, F ′ ∈ F we put
v(F ∩ F ′) :=
∑
{v(G) | G ∈ F(F ∩ F ′) maximal}
A game v on F is supermodular if for all intersecting F, F ′ ∈ F , we have
v(F ∪ F ′) + v(F ∩ F ′) ≥ v(F ) + (F ′).
Theorem 6.6. A game v is convex if and only if v is strongly monotone
and supermodular.
6.3 Extension of v on 2N
Let F be weakly union-closed, and v be a game on F . We introduce an
extension of v on 2N as follows:
v(S) =
∑
T maximal in F(S)
v(T ), ∀S ⊆ N.
Remark 6.7. (i) This way of extending a game on 2N appears in many dif-
ferent works. For communication graphs, Myerson (1977b) used it for
computing vG(S), the extension on 2
N of a game v on G, for any S ⊆ N ,
decomposing S into its (maximal) connected components (in this con-
text, see also Owen (1986), Borm et al. (1992), Potters and Reijnierse
(1995)). It can be found also in Bilbao (2000, §5.2) with F a partition
system, under the name of F-restricted game, and in Bilbao and Ordo´n˜ez
(2008). In general, it is considered in all the literature on communication
graphs. This extension has been studied by Faigle and Grabisch (2009),
and arises naturally as the output of the Monge algorithm described in
Section 6.2 (see (ii) and (iii) below).
(ii) Even if v is monotone, v need not be monotone. If v is monotone, it
is not the smallest extension of v (for this replace
∑
by max in the
above equation). If F is union-closed, then v is the smallest extension
and preserves monotonicity of v (Faigle and Grabisch, 2009).
(iii) v is given by the Monge algorithm, i.e., v(S) = vˆ(1S) for all S ∈ 2N .
(iv) The Mo¨bius transform (see Section 3) of v vanishes for all S not in F
(easy fact, remarked by Owen (1986)). More precisely:
mv(S) =
{
mv(S), for all S ∈ F
0, otherwise
where mv is the Mo¨bius transform of v on F .
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(v) For any game v, we always have core+(v) = core+(v). Indeed, the
inclusion of core+(v) in core+(v) is obvious. Conversely, assume that
x ∈ core+(v) and take any F 6∈ F . Then v(F ) =
∑
T maximal in F(F ) v(T ).
We have x(T ) ≥ v(T ) for all T maximal in F(F ). Therefore, since these
T ’s are disjoint and x is nonnegative, we find x(F ) ≥ v(F ). Adapting
the previous argument, core(v) = core(v) holds provided all singletons
belongs to F . Then the maximal sets in F(F ) form a partition of F (F
is a partition system).
Faigle and Grabisch (2009) have proved the following.
Theorem 6.8. Assume F is union-closed, and v is a game on F . Then
v is supermodular on F (in the sense of Section 6.2) if and only if v is
supermodular on 2N .
7 Games on communication graphs
7.1 General definitions
Consider a (undirected) graph G = (N,E), where the vertices are players,
and E is the set of links. A link between i, j exists if these players can
communicate or are friends. Two players are connected if there exists a
path between them. A connected coalition is a subset of N where any two
players are connected. The set of connected coalitions is denoted by CE(N).
Maximal connected coalitions of G are called connected components of G,
and they partition N . The set of connected components of G is denoted by
N/E. Any coalition S ⊆ N , even if not connected, can be partitioned into
maximal connected coalitions (i.e., connected components of the subgraph
induced by S). The set of connected components of S is denoted by S/E.
This is the framework defined by Myerson (1977a).
Remark 7.1. (i) As said in Section 3.7, set collections induced by communi-
cation graphs are exactly augmenting systems containing all singletons.
If the graph is connected, then they are regular set systems containing all
singletons (the converse is false). Recall also from Section 3.5 the char-
acterization of van den Brink, and that these set collections are weakly
union-closed.
(ii) A generalization of communication graphs is done through conference
structures of Myerson, or equivalently through hypergraphs (see Sec-
tion 3.5).
A game on the graph G = (N,E) is a TU-game on CE(N) (i.e., it is a
game on the collection of feasible coalitions F = CE(N)). From v we define
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the extended game vG on 2
N as follows (see Section 6.3; called point game
by Borm et al. (1992))
vG(S) =
∑
T∈S/E
v(T ), ∀S ⊆ N.
Since a communication graph may contain several connected compo-
nents, and recalling Remark 3.5 (ii), a natural adaptation for the definition
of the core is as follows:
core(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(C) = v(C), ∀C ∈ N/E, and x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ CE(N)}.
This definition was considered, among others, by Demange (1994, 2004). As
it is easy to show, core(v) = core(vG), which proves that when nonempty
the core is a polytope.
Remark 7.2. Note that if the graph is connected, we recover the definition
of the previous sections, hence all general properties given in Section 5.1
apply. Concerning the positive core, results in Section 6.2 apply under the
same condition. Using again Remark 3.5 (ii), the above definition of the core
amounts to take the intersection of all cores on the subsystems induced by
the connected components of G.
We consider below the main families of communication graph, most use-
ful in applications.
7.2 Communication line-graphs
Let us assume that the players are ordered according to the natural ordering
1, . . . , n, and consider the set of edges connecting two adjacent players:
E0 = {(i, i + 1), i = 1, . . . , n − 1}. Then G = (N,E) is a line-graph if
E ⊆ E0, i.e., only some adjacent players can communicate. For convenience,
we introduce the notation [i, j] := {i, i+ 1, . . . , j} for i < j in N .
These line-graphs often arise in applications, e.g., water distribution
problem along a river (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002), and auctions situations
(Graham et al., 1990), and have been studied by van den Brink et al. (2007).
They show that a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core is
linear convexity:
v([i, j])− v([i+ 1, j])− v([i, j − 1]) + v([i+ 1, j − 1]) ≥ 0
for all [i, j] ∈ C(E)N .
van den Brink (2009) has characterized communication line-graphs in
terms of the associated set system as follows.
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Theorem 7.3. A collection F ⊆ 2N is the set of connected coalitions of
a line-graph if and only if F ∋ ∅, F is normal (i.e.,
⋃
F = N), weakly
union-closed, satisfies 2-accessibility (see Remark 3.4 (ii)) and path union
stability.
To explain the last property, we need some definitions. Let ∅ 6= S ∈ F and
i ∈ S. Then i is an extreme player in S if S \ i ∈ F . Now, S is a path in F
if it has exactly two extreme players. The name comes from the fact that
a path in F corresponds to a path in the graph (although the converse is
false). Path union stability means that the union of two nondisjoint paths
in F is still a path in F .
7.3 Cycle-free communication graphs
A graph is cyle-free if it contains no cycle, in the usual sense of graph
theory. Le Breton et al. (1992) have characterized this property by what
they call strong balancedness : the collection F of connected coalitions is
strongly balanced if every balanced collection contains a partition of N .
Another characterization is due to van den Brink (2009).
Theorem 7.4. A collection F ⊆ 2N is the set of connected coalitions of a
cycle-free graph if and only if F ∋ ∅, F is normal (i.e.,
⋃
F = N), weakly
union-closed, satisfies 2-accessibility (see Remark 3.4 (ii)) and weak path
union stability.
Weak path union stability means that path union stability is required only
for those pairs of paths having a common extreme player.
An important particular case of cycle-free communication graph is the
case of connected graphs. Then the graph is called a tree. Games on trees
have been studied by many authors, among them Demange (1994, 2004),
Herings et al. (2008), Khmelnitskaya (2009), Baron et al. (2008) and Be´al
et al. (2009). However, most of these works are more concerned with single-
valued solution (as the average tree solution of Herings et al. (2008)) than
the core.
7.4 Cycle-complete communication graphs
A communication graph is cycle-complete if for each cycle of the graph, the
subgraph induced by the players in that cycle is complete (i.e., each player
is connected to every player in the cycle).
van den Nouweland and Borm (1991) have studied this kind of commu-
nication graph. They have shown that if the game v is convex (assuming v
is defined on 2N , unlike our assumption), then vG is also convex.
van den Brink (2009) has characterized cycle-complete communication
graphs as follows.
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Theorem 7.5. A collection F ⊆ 2N is the set of connected coalitions of
a cycle-free graph if and only if F ∋ ∅, F is normal (i.e.,
⋃
F = N),
weakly union-closed, satisfies 2-accessibility (see Remark 3.4 (ii)) and the
path property.
F has the path property if for every pair of players i, j, there is at most one
path having i, j as extremal players. Alternatively, the path property can
be replaced by closure under intersection.
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